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This article mobilises transdisciplinary inquiry to explore and deconstruct the often-used comparison 
of racialized/colonized people, intellectually disabled people and mad people as being like children.  To 
be child-like is a metaphor that is used to denigrate, to classify as irrational and incompetent, to dismiss 
as not being knowledge-holders, to justify governance and action on others’ behalf, to deem as being 
animistic, as un-developed, under-developed or wrongly-developed, and, hence, to subjugate. We 
explore the political work done by the metaphorical appeal to childhood, and particularly the centrality 
of the metaphor of childhood to legitimising colonialism and white supremacy. The article attends to 
the ways in which this metaphor contributes to the shaping of the material and discursive realities of 
racialized and colonized others as well as those who have been psychiatrized and deemed ‘intellectually 
disabled’. Further, we explore specific metaphors of child-colony, and child-mad-‘crip’. We then detail 
the developmental logic underlying the historical and continued use of the metaphorics of childhood 
and explore how this makes possible an infantilisation of colonized peoples and the global South more 
widely.  The material and discursive impact of this metaphor on children’s lives, and particularly 
children who are racialized, colonized, and/or deemed mad or ‘crip’, is then considered.  We argue 
that complex adult-child relations, sane-mad relations and Western-majority world relations within 
global psychiatry, are situated firmly within pejorative notions of what it means to be child-like, and 
reproduce multi-systemic forms of oppression that, ostensibly in their ‘best interests’, govern children 





To be child-like is a metaphor that has been used for centuries to denigrate and subordinate certain 
groups including racialized/colonized others, and/or psychiatrized and disabled people. Erica Burman 
states that an important analytic task “is to render explicit the work done by the rhetorical appeal to 
childhood” (Burman 2016, 2).  Inspired by Burman, the analytic task of this article is to trace the work 
done by the metaphorical appeal to childhood, specifically in relation to colonialism, madness and 
disability. We ask: how does the ‘child’ function as metaphor, and what is the performative nature of 
this metaphor – what does it do both for those deemed child-like, and for actual children (Mills 2014)?  
While the metaphorics of childhood in relation to child/colony have been well documented, less 
attention has been paid to the metaphorics of the child in relation to madness and disability. Thus, 
this article takes seriously the need to explore the centrality of the child and ‘child-like’ in the 
development of white supremacy (Levander 2006), colonialism, sanism, disablism, and ableism1.  
 
For Ashis Nandy (2007), the Western worldview of childhood as an imperfect transitional state on the 
way to adulthood is embedded in ideologies of colonialism and modernity, meaning “the use of the 
metaphor of childhood [is] a major justification of all exploitation” (59). Accordingly, parentification 
- or even in loco-parentis - has been used to justify, and to deem benevolent, interventions used by the 
powerful to ‘protect’ those who are ‘child-like’.  Not so hidden from the surface are the vested 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the importance of deconstructing dis/ableism and the distinction between disablism and ableism see Liddiard (2018). 
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capitalist interests as well as the social, political, and psychological agendas of power and control taken 
on by those in the parental role within these socially constructed and contrived ‘parent-child’ relations.  
The developmental logic that underlies these power relations legitimizes various regimes of ruling that 
promote the subordination of certain groups in the name of benevolence. In this article, we 
demonstrate the ways in which these forced paternalistic encounters, and the infantilisation that 
characterize them, serve not only to debase and erase racialized/colonized, psychiatrized and/or 
disabled adults and children as knowers, but also serve to reinscribe children themselves as 
incompetent and inferior.  Colonial logics intersect with medical and psychiatric logics that enable not 
just the marking of certain individual bodies as sub-human but the global categorizing of whole groups 
of people as being undeveloped, under-developed and/or wrongly-developed.  Correspondingly, we 
understand the importance placed within mainstream corporate academia upon the sub-fields of 
developmental studies within political science, international development, international relations, 
economics, geography, child psychology, and medicine, all which serve the same function of 
maintaining the status quo of (white) supremacy whilst (re)producing majority world people, children, 
psychiatrized and/or disabled people as child-like (Blaut 1993).  We expose and contest such 
debasement whilst also disputing the essentialized and adultist meanings contained within the very 
concept of child-like, a concept which emanates from dominant Euro-Western and adult-centric 
constructions of childhood. 
 
Metaphor is “pervasive in everyday life” and is classically understood as structuring the way we think 
and act and enabling us to understand and experience “one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980, 3-5). Yet many concepts may not be separate as such and may be historically 
entangled with one another. Metaphors are contextually bound and have a performative aspect in that 
they structure what action we can take (Kövecses 2015).  Understanding something through metaphor 
can hide aspects of a concept that are not consistent with that metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), 
and thus metaphors can be used to do political and ideological work. We are interested in how certain 
groups of peoples (colonised, racialized, mad and crip2) come to be understood, talked about and 
acted upon through the metaphor of childhood. Specifically, the pervasive, entangled and co-
constitutive nature of metaphors of the child, colony/‘savage’, mad and crip are explored. The 
intersections of these metaphors call for an approach attuned to overlaps and not constricted by 
disciplinary boundaries.  
 
We engage in this analysis through a creative transdisciplinary inquiry that is not discipline-specific but 
instead brings together knowledges that are rarely understood to co-exist and that may at times be in 
tension with each other (Augsburg 2014; Leavy 2006; Mitchell and Moore 2015; Montuori 2013). 
Transdisciplinarity – as contingent and non-essentialised - alerts us to and rejects the politics of 
differentiation and exclusion key to the bordering and disciplining practices of social scientific 
knowledge and their beginnings in the codification of Enlightenment era rationality used to justify 
slavery, colonialism and apartheid (Sehume 2013). Following Nicolescu (2008), we understand 
transdisciplinary inquiry to be a form of meaning-making that breaks down the academic hierarchy of 
epistemological relationships, that is open to different forms of logic including that which is unknown 
(Augsburg 2014), and that strives to eliminate epistemic injustice (Leblanc & Kinsella 2016) or 
epistemicide (Santos 2014). Further, our inquiry is informed by mad studies, critical disability studies, 
critical childhood studies, as well as critical race, transnational and post-colonial theories.   
                                                 
2 We use the terms ‘mad’ and ‘crip’ as reclaimed signifiers and as concepts that unsettle, contest and challenge normalcy and biological 
reductionism (LeFrançois, Menzies & Reaume, 2013; Liddiard, 2018; McRuer, 2006). The terms ‘psychiatrized’, ‘mad’ and ‘madness’ are used 
interchangeably in this article, as are the terms ‘crip’, ‘disabled’, ‘intellectually disabled’ and ‘disability’. 
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Mad studies transgresses the academy and its disciplines, with its beginnings being located outside the 
academy and within mad social movements (Gorman and LeFrançois 2017; LeFrançois, Menzies, and 
Reaume 2013; Russo and Sweeney 2016).  A transdisciplinarity lens is consistent with Mad studies, in 
that it is not only inquiry based but also questions the logics and the very form in which that inquiry 
may take (Augsburg, 2014), whilst Mad studies may further rebelliously challenging enlightenment and 
eurocentric notions of rationality (Blaut 1993) which underpins and structures knowledge emanating 
from academic disciplines (Sehume 2013).  That is, at times, Mad studies may be at odds with 
rationalism as the basis of knowledge production and as the basis of the formation of the academy. 
As Bruce (2017) notes, “(r)ationalist readers may fear that such a mad study…detrimentally reinforces 
myths of black savagery and subrationality. Such investment in rationalism presumes that Reason is 
paramount for fully realized modern personhood” (307).  Like Bruce (2017), we reject such 
investments and presumptions, and our work instead interrogates the adultist, disablist, sanist, colonial 
and racist logics that often underpin the conventional academic imaginary. However, the debasement 
of mad people’s knowledges does not just occur within the academy but also within the general public 
(Leblanc & Kinsella, 2016).  As such, Mad studies produces knowledge where the meaning-making of 
mad people is centered, but where other meanings emanating from other sources – academic or 
otherwise - also can be considered and deconstructed, incorporated or rejected.  
 
So too do we argue that (critical) childhood studies should also be seen as transdisciplinary (Mitchell 
and Moore 2015) and as a direct challenge on ‘Reason’ as key for children’s entrance into a fully 
realized personhood, given the ways adultist notions of children’s inherent irrationality, lack of 
reason, rule by passion, animism (Scott and Chrisjohn, forthcoming), and their supposed lack of 
contribution as productive members of (capitalist) society3 is conventionally inscribed on their 
bodies and minds in the West. According to Rollo (2018, 61) this denigration and subordination of 
children – misopedy –was in ancient Greece a “form of social and political hierarchy”. Here the 
child functions as the ontological other to reason and politics; children as a group for whom there 
was seen to be a moral obligation to assist but for whom political claims were seen as impossible. It 
was this that made possible the framing of violence as necessary and legitimated as being in 
children’s ‘best interests’. As these dominant notions of children and childhood not only exist but 
also shut down discussions of the social construction of childhood within most academic disciplines 
(child psychology, sociology, social work, medicine, psychiatry, etc), understanding (critical) 
childhood studies as a direct challenge to this denotes the desire to disrupt and break away from 
“the governing strictures found within academic modes of dominant knowledge production that 
both center and reproduce privileged and constraining notions of reason and productivity” 
(Voronka and LeFrançois forthcoming).  For the most part, the academy neither acknowledges the 
existence of nor includes knowledge production emanating from children themselves, whether such 
contributions mirror dominant (adult) discourses or not, as the concept of ‘children’s contributions’ 
is read through an adultist lens.  This is not to imply that the heterogeneous accounts of children 
and/or mad people are innocent, it is instead about radically calling into question what the academy 
counts as knowledge.  For those contributions deemed child-like, whether they emanate from 
children, colonized and racialized peoples, psychiatrized or disabled people, transdisciplinarity 
coupled with Mad studies may provide a theoretical and methodological platform for ensuring 
epistemic justice through both the deconstruction of dominant, racist, sanist and ableist strictures 
                                                 
3 These are Euro-Western understandings of childhood, which not only negate the realities of children’s abilities and experiences in the West, 
but further make invisible the lives of children in the global South, including those who are materially affected by the capitalist exploitation that 
characterizes much child labour practices. 
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but also by opening up a wider space for meaning-making beyond such adultist and Euro-Western 
positivism. We argue that the use of child as metaphor operates as a form of epistemicide - a “failure 
to recognise the different ways of knowing by which people across the globe provide meaning to 
their existence”, including different ways of knowing children. This operates as a form “cognitive 
injustice” often followed by attempts to destroy epistemological diversity with a single story that 
claims to be universal (Santos 2014, 111), including a single developmental story about children and 
those deemed child-like. These concepts are mostly used by Santos in reference to the violent 
eradication of Indigenous knowledge systems enabled through a colonial framing of irrationality. Yet 
cognitive injustice is also at work in the dismissal of alternative experiences of reality and alternative 
cognitions that are classified as ‘mad’ and intellectually disabled respectively, and hence, marked as 
incompetency and irrationality. 
 
Child as metaphor  
 
We are interested in how the child functions as a metaphor for colonized, racialized, psychiatrized and 
disabled peoples. Literature on the iconography of childhood usually makes a distinction between 
metaphorical or symbolic and actual ‘flesh and blood’ children (Burman 2016; Morrigan 2017). We 
also make this distinction here by exploring the performative nature of ‘child as metaphor’ for those 
deemed child-like, and for actual children. However, in making this distinction we do not seek to reify 
a naturalized and essentialized developmental child. Sánchez-Eppler (2005) notes the entanglement of 
“childhood as a discourse and childhood as persons”, particularly in Euro-Western affective 
deployments of childhood (pxxiii). Furthermore, we recognize that given the “societally as well as 
intrapsychically invested character of childhood, arguably all appeals to “the child” are metaphorical” 
(Burman 2016, 2; Stainton Rogers and Stainton Rogers 1992).  Our point of departure, then, is the 
analytic task outlined by Burman (2016) to render “explicit the work done by the rhetorical appeal to 
childhood” (2), and the task in this article is to trace the work done by the metaphorical appeal to 
childhood, specifically in relation to colonialism, madness and disability. While we are concerned with 
the effects of metaphor, we are cognizant that the conceptual basis on which ‘child as metaphor’ 
functions is largely a Euro-Western construction of childhood as an early rung on a linear 
developmental ladder and a stage marked by a lack of intellectual capacity, dependency, irrationality, 
animism, emotionality, – or ‘rule by passion’, and economic unproductivity (Blaut 1993). This is an 
evolutionary and developmentalist narrative globalised by the ‘West’ as a universal standard 
(Nieuwenhuys 2009), and as we shall see, is deeply entangled with colonialism (Blaut 1993) and 





Multiple colonial texts portray colonized people as children, for instance, as “sullen peoples, Half-
devil and half-child’ (Kipling 1899). Nandy (1987/2007) finds that there are a number of “metaphor[s] 
of childhood that justified colonialism”, from James Mill’s conception of Britain as an adult guiding 
the development of India, to Cecil Rhodes’ assertion (in Southern Africa) that “the native is to be 
treated as a child and denied franchise” (58). Here we see evidence that “colonial ideology required 
savages to be children, but it also feared that savages could be like children” [and indeed that children 
could be ‘savage’] (Nandy 1987/2007, 58) - a dual framing of children as at once innocent and 
dangerous.  
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Postcolonial theory has long recognized the centrality of “the metaphor of childhood [as] legitimizing 
colonialism and modernity” (Nandy 1987/2007, 69), where the “child-native” performs a discursive 
function “foundational to the ideology of imperialism” (Barker 2011, 7). Thus, the “classic connection 
in the colonial library is, of course, that between the colonized other and the white child” (Eriksson 
Baaz 2005, 52). Burman (2016) states that “longstanding colonial dynamics link children with the 
colonised”, where child/colony comes to stand as other/ed to the male western industrialized liberal 
self (10). Yet unlike ableist imaginings of the ideal imperial white child, colonized peoples are 
constructed as permanently child-like, unable to develop further (Barker 2011), and as stuck within a 
state of savagery and ‘mental infancy’ (Scott and Chrisjohn forthcoming). This diverges from Rollo’s 
compelling argument that the child provides the internal structure and logic of the colonial conception 
of the “Indian”’ (2018, 63) meaning the ‘child’ is a homology, not a metaphor, for settler colonialism. 
Thus, Rollo concludes it is ‘not contingent’ but ‘necessary that justificatory frameworks of European 
empire and colonialism depict Indigenous peoples as children’ (2018, 60). Despite our focus in this 
paper on metaphor, we acknowledge the need for further discussion as to differences between 
homology and metaphor, and about what each framing may make visible and foreclose. The 
metaphoric of child/colony is contingent on patriarchal domination, where the familial ruling of the 
husband/father is naturalized as a model for colonial domination (McClintock 1995). It is also 
contingent on what Melber (1989 cited in Heinz 1998) describes as the ‘colonial view’ - a process that 
reconfigures inequities and difference as modes of evolutionary hierarchy and that represents western 
white adult males as the highest stage of evolution against which colonised peoples are constructed as 
inferior. This is evident in psychoanalytical framings that posit “the Negro is just a child” (Fanon 
1987/2007, 27). 
 
Nandy has commented on the seeming “subsidiary homology between childhood and the state of 
being colonized” (1983, 11), and the “implied homology between the adult-child relationship and the 
West-East encounter under colonialism” (1987/2007, 70). Similarly, it is this “colonial conflation of 
the colonized with the figure of the child” that, for Nieuwenhuys (2009, 149), needs to be interrogated 
to enable a deconstruction of “childhood as a metaphor for institutionalized violence visited upon 
humanity in the name of progress”. In this way, the trope of the ‘child-like’ functions to reframe 
violence - to construct it as necessary, legitimate and, even, benevolent. 
 
Nelson Mandela describes the racialization of the South African prison system, in which black African 
prisoners (unlike white prisoners) were forced to wear shorts because “African men are deemed ‘boys’ 
by the authorities” (Mandela 1994, 396). This racist infantilisation of Black people persists in both colony 
and metropole, with black men routinely referred to as ‘boy’ (Burman 1994). In this way, as noted by 
Levander (2006): “the child works to establish race as a central shaping element of ostensibly raceless 
Western ideals…[Thus] excavating the child’s importance to the development of white supremacy is 
urgently needed” (2–3). Goerg (2012) argues that colonial logics include an entrenched openly racist 
paternalism where Africans were infantilised as ‘child-people’ and hence treated like ‘big children’ or 
as being and living in a ‘state of childhood’. This comparison of colonized people to children was 
evident in French Africa, the Belgian Congo, as well as the British and Portuguese colonies (Goerg 
2012).  While Hegel said that ‘Africa proper’ was the “land of childhood” (1975, 91). Yet, the metaphor 
of childhood as violent not only impacts on those constructed as ‘child-like’ but has had, and continues 
to have, materially violent effects for colonised and racialized children. 
Much in the same way that Piaget falsely assessed children as being incapable of abstract thinking 
(Piaget 1967; 1953) – an adultist and markedly masculine Euro-Western interpretation of children’s 
Mills and LeFrancois 2018 
Pre-production copy – not for circulation  
abilities (Burman 1997; Macnamara 1976; Prout & James 1997) - so too did white supremacy in the 
form of colonization lead to the assessment of Africans as having limited ability to engage in 
abstraction. Colonial authorities saw themselves as protectors of the colonized; people who, like 
children, were impressionable and immature, unable to exercise critical judgement, had ‘weak 
intellects’, and were, therefore, in need of guidance. As Goerg (2012) explains, this was exemplified in 
1949 when Sudanese officials requested censorship of French and other foreign films that were seen 
as having a bad influence on their children and young people.  This call was echoed by Senegalese 
officials and others within French West Africa4, looking to bolster already in place local censorship 
laws through a stronger decree and the application of consistent compliance. This call for supervision 
from the West Africans themselves fed into colonial logics of the incompetence of colonial subjects, 
and the mission to protect peoples who were understood to have by nature less capacity intellectually 
than their white colonizers.   As West African adults attempted to shield their young people from what 
many considered immoral and violent influences of foreign cinema, and perhaps in an effort to resist 
assimilation of their young people, French authorities readily supported this call, in order to shield 
themselves from the potential of any radicalization provoked by the subversive content of some of 
these films.  In this example, we see an intertwining of and a direct connection between West African 
parent-child relations and colonizer-colonized relations, and the protectionism that mutually 
constituted both, with notions of morality, public order and obedience providing the motivation to 
enforce such a protectionist stance.  
At the same time, many colonial administrators romanticized and exoticized those they were 
colonizing and felt compelled through racist stereotyping to preserve their (white) image of an unspoilt 
(black) Africa (Goerg 2012), much in the same way that the (heterosexual) Western imaginary calls for 
the preservation of ‘childhood innocence’ (Greensmith and Sheppard 2017; Morrigan 2017; Scraton 
1997).  However, rather than merely and ostensibly protecting African children and preserving “Black 
Africa”, the colonizers were most concerned with self-protection and maintaining their economic 
interests within Africa. Indeed, as Goerg (2012) notes, the targeting of West African children and 
young people for this exercise of control and censorship ensued as they were seen as not only the 
most vulnerable but also as the most dangerous to colonial powers, given that it is the young people 
who were understood to be more likely to revolt against the violence of colonisation and foreign 
domination. By falsely claiming the right to choose for others, established in the name of moral and 
intellectual superiority, and often inscribed legally through the ‘rule of law’ imposed in many colonies, 
political, economic and cultural domination through white supremacy persisted (Georg 2012; McBride 
2016).  In this example, colonized children were perceived by both colonized and colonizing adults 
(albeit for very different reasons) as in need of saving from foreign cultural influences, in attempt to 
perhaps preserve their “childhood innocence” on the one hand, to preserve African cultures or the 
“culture of Black Africa” on the other hand, and with a third underhanded agenda on the part of the 
colonizers, to preserve colonial power and authority. African children themselves appear to have been 
left silenced on the question of the censorship of foreign cinema by both the racist infantilisation of 
Africa as a whole, and by the adultism that was used to further debase them as West African young 
people. 
According to Valentin and Meinert (2009), the “civilization of the children of the ‘savages’ in the 
colonial world was an inherent part of the colonization mission in Africa, the Americas and Oceania 
                                                 
4 French West Africa consisted of Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (Mali), French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Burkino Faso, Benin, Niger, Togo 
and parts of Nigeria. 
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in the 19th century” (23). For example, in the settler-colonial context of Canada, huge numbers of 
Indigenous children were forcibly taken from their families and communities and incarcerated in 
residential schools, which explicitly aimed to ‘kill the Indian in the child’ (Razack 2015).  Here another 
powerful use of metaphor is evident in the construction of First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples as 
an inevitably “dying race”, incapable of self-governance, enabling residential schools to be justified as 
‘saving’ Indigenous children’ from “the death of their race” (Chapman, Carey, and Ben-Moshe 2014, 
7; Kelm 2005). This logic has many similarities to the child apprehension policies within 
racist/colonialist child protection systems that led to the ‘sixties scoop’ (Chrisjohn and Young 1997; 
Blackstock 2009; LeFrançois 2013) and, in what is now Australia and Torres Strait, constituted the 
‘stolen generation’ (Read 1981). Continuing since the ‘sixties scoop’, Indigenous children remain vastly 
over-represented within the Canadian child protection system (Chrisjohn and Young 1997; LeFrançois 
2013). Here, a difference becomes apparent in the colonial violence enacted on colonised adults who 
are constructed as ‘child-like’ and on actual colonised children, constructed as in need of saving both 
from their Indigenous parents and kin, as well as from their indigeneity.   
A key effect of constructing colonised peoples through the metaphor of childhood is to justify 
governance of the ‘natives’ who are constituted as “immature, childlike beings that need to be 
subjected to European discipline and control” (Giesebrecht 1898 cited in Heinz 1998, 427).  In this 
way, non-Europeans were constructed as  
 
ripe for government, passive, child-like...needing leadership and guidance, described always in 
terms of lack-no initiative, no intellectual powers...; or on the other hand, they are outside 
society, dangerous, treacherous, emotional, inconstant, wild, threatening, fickle, sexually 
aberrant, irrational, near animal, lascivious, disruptive, evil, unpredictable (Carr 1985, 50).  
 
Moreover, assimilated colonized people in Africa– those who behaved less ‘native’ and acquired the 
mannerisms of their colonizers - were seen as less childlike, and those who were judged to be, or 
physically appeared to be, “more black” were seen as more childlike (Georg, 2012). In addition, 
colonized subjects who outwardly demonstrated their intelligence in ways that could not be denied by 
the white lens were marked as an aberration or hors-norme, perhaps much in the same way that 
intellectually ‘gifted children’ are seen as extraordinary, as not actually ‘like other children’ or as not 
really ‘child-like’. The television series The Blacklist5 provides a contemporary example of these 
enduring colonial logics.  Dembe, a black Sudanese bodyguard working for the white criminal 
Reddington, is portrayed as having been saved by Reddington – and hence, saved by white 
benevolence – at the age of 14, after years of enslavement within an African human trafficking ring. 
Characterized with several stereotypes consistent with racializing logics, such as having superior 
physical prowess and readily engaging in violence, Dembe is also portrayed as intelligent, thanks in 
part to the education that Reddington provided him.  In the episode entitled The Endling, Reddington 
plays scrabble with the now 40-something Dembe, and in response to Dembe accumulating points, 
Reddington states: “Honestly. You're like one of those extraordinary children who knows how to spell 
onomatopoeia”.  Here, we witness the invoking of both the racist colonial logics of ‘black man as 
child’ and white Euro-Western notions of what constitutes ‘normal’ childhood intelligence, together 
                                                 
5 Season 5, episode 4, 2017, The Endling. See: https://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-show=the-
blacklist&episode=s05e04 
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forming both the denigration and exultation of Dembe as intelligent - as hors-norme and remarkable 
both for a black man and for a child.  
 
Child/Mad - Child/‘Crip’ 
 
In the Eurocentric imaginary, the “colonized were discursively linked and compared not only with 
women and children, but also mental patients, criminals, and the working-class in Europe”, where 
“’primitives’ were equated with children and the mentally disturbed” (Eriksson Baaz 2005, 53-54). 
Nandy reads this fear of childishness as a symptom of psychological insecurity in cultures which use 
“the metaphor of childhood to define mental illness, primitivism, abnormality, [and] 
underdevelopment” (1987/2007, 65). Disability and madness figure in three key ways within the 
colonial apparatus: the representation of colonized peoples as child-like and thus impaired and 
irrational; ableist discourse as central to domination; and the idea that the colony can itself disable and 
drive white people mad. We discuss madness and disability, and specifically intellectual disability, 
alongside each other because the distinction between them in much contemporary discourse doesn’t 
hold historically and is also in part a construction of ‘western’ medicalized and psy discourse.   
 
It is not unusual for adults who have been psychiatrized to indicate that they are treated as being 
childlike by those who work within psychiatric services. This infantilisation is evident in Malacrida’s 
(2015) account of Canadian institutions for intellectually disabled people where “inmates regardless 
of their age were treated as though they were children”, not permitted freedom of movement or 
choice, and were seen as incapable (90-91). In many ways, being deemed childlike, using denigrating 
Euro-Western understandings of what constitutes a child, is a classic example of the form of sanism 
(Poole et al 2012; Meerei, Abdillah, and Poole 2016) that is deeply rooted within psychiatry and within 
society generally.  The comparison of Mad people to children is embedded within historical and 
current day psychiatric practices. For example, the evolutionary psychiatry dominant in England from 
1870 to the First World War posited that insanity constituted an evolutionary reversal – a movement 
backwards on the assumed evolutionary developmental scale (Showalter 1985). Sicherman (1977) 
points out the similarities between infancy and the ‘enforced dependency’ of the rest cure, developed 
as treatment for white upper-class women diagnosed with neurasthenia with treatment constituting 
‘child-like obedience’ to a male physician. The current day Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-
V) continues to list ‘childishness’ and ‘childlike behavior’ in adults as a symptom of mental illness.  
What constitutes childlike behaviour in the DSM includes such things as ‘silliness’, being 
‘disorganized’, ‘clinging’ to others, ‘unpredictable agitation’, ‘self-effacing and docile behavior’ and 
‘gregarious flamboyance with active demands for attention’, which can be found as symptoms within 
the categories of dependent personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder as well as 
schizophrenia spectrum and other related psychotic disorders.   
 
Not only do we find here stereotypes of the essentialized child and associated behaviours, but we find 
also the essentializing of narrowly defined adult behaviours, with those daring to behave differently 
being deemed mad.  The implications of these diagnostic criteria for colonized people are exemplified 
by Chrisjohn and McKay’s (2017) demonstration that despite centuries of the racist infantilisation of 
Indigenous peoples (motivated by capitalist greed and enacted through white supremancy), by the 
1990s Indigenous peoples in Canada began to be labelled as dependent and thus psychopathologized 
with dependent personality disorder.  Chrisjohn and McKay (2017) explain:  
 
(I)t was economic conservatives doing the talking, and they weren’t using dependency 
in any recognizable economic form (you know, as in seizing the assets and means of 
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production of a whole people and determining the shape and direction of their 
fundamental economic activities)...(Instead) (t)hey applied it to us… We were 
suffering from ‘dependency disorder’; or even, from the lack of an ‘entrepreneurial 
instinct’, such as they themselves possessed.  This defect accounted for our absence 
in the mainstream Canadian political economy, our economic backwardness, our 
relative joblessness, why we got fired a lot, and why we were always late for 
appointments.  The cure…consisted of cancelling all treaties, ending any social 
programs and subsidies, taxing Indian reserve lands (and seizing the lands when taxes 
weren’t paid on time)…The self-serving circularity of the whole conception bypassed 
even a hint of science…: we obviously had the ‘inner, hidden trait’ of dependency 
(167-168). 
 
Here we see the ways in which the infantilisation of generation after generation of Indigenous peoples 
is then later characterized by psychiatry as a mental illness within those who have been infantilised, in 
the form of dependency. The source of the violence of colonization, dispossession and genocide is 
obscured with the psychiatric gaze turning directly onto the colonized rather than the colonizers.  
Psychiatrization is thus deployed in order to divert attention away from the violence exerted upon 
colonized peoples (Chrisjohn and McKay 2017). 
 
The political utility of diagnoses of mental illness is further exemplified in Samuel Cartwright’s coining 
of drapetomania - the ‘mental disease’ that was said to compel enslaved Africans in the Americas to 
run away. This too was entangled with the metaphorics of childhood, when Cartwright wrote that 
“(l)ike children, they [slaves] are constrained by unalterable physiological laws, to love those in 
authority over them. Hence, from a law of his nature, the negro can no more help loving a kind master, 
than the child can help loving her that gives it suck” (Cartwright 1851, cited in Gould 1981, 71). As 
treatment, Cartwright prescribed continued slavery and the handling of slaves like children, in order 
to ‘cure’ them from running away.  
 
Throughout colonial texts colonized peoples were represented as limited in intellectual capacity, as 
behaviourally disordered, as physically degenerate (Barker 2011) and as animistic (Scott and Chrisjohn 
forthcoming), depicting “the colony not only [as] a child but an oafish child” (Prentice 1997, 71). Scott 
and Chrisjohn (forthcoming) note that racism (and disablism) fuels the assertion, first declared by 
cultural anthropologist E.B. Taylor in 1871, that ‘primitives’ like children are inherently animistic: they 
believe (wrongly) that everything is alive. This assertion designates colonized people, intellectually 
disabled people and/or children as having a general lack of attachment to reality, as ‘backward’ and 
cripped as ‘simpletons’; and as stuck within a state of savagery and ‘mental infancy’ (Scott and 
Chrisjohn forthcoming).  Imperial children are understood to eventually grow out of it whereas 
Indigenous peoples are locked into permanent animism.  Chrisjohn elaborates that: 
 
When Indians say something like they believe in honouring the spirits in the 
environment around them, they are childish, unsophisticated animist philosophers who 
are just wrong and stuck in…(undeveloped) ‘emotional’ or ‘cultural’ faculties…(I)t is 
racism and it is maybe the biggest part of infantilizing Native people6.  
 
                                                 
6 Personal communication, November 15, 2017. 
Mills and LeFrancois 2018 
Pre-production copy – not for circulation  
This understanding of animism – as a lack of attachment to reality – is also used as justification to 
psychiatrize and drug people who hear voices and/or who see, feel or communicate with spiritual 
entities in their midst. 
 
The trope of ‘disabled child-nation’ has its “antecedents in a long colonial history in which childhood 
and disability contributed substantially to the conceptual apparatus of empire” (Barker 2011, 7). The 
construction of colonized peoples as “permanently child-like” worked to frame European imperialists 
as “permanent guardians” (McEwan 2009, 136), masking colonial “ambitions to achieve global 
sovereignty under the rhetorical banner of a duty of care” (Barker 2011, 7).  Barker (2011) shows how 
this permanent state of childhood is suggestive of disability in a way that mediates the racialized 
differences between colonized child and colonizer adult. Ableist discourse was central to bolstering 
colonial and racial domination, where the ‘subtext of disability’ suspended ‘normal’ developmental 
logic, with colonised peoples seen as unable to fully develop, “producing a model of arrested 
development that stabilized and consolidated the conditions required for ongoing colonial 
dependency” (Barker 2011, 8). In this way, “the child, figured as a developing body, has been used in 
the making of global hierarchies and knowledge” (Castañeda 2002, 13). The expansion of imperialism 
throughout the mid-nineteenth century fed into and occurred alongside the establishment of 
developmental norms and the science of eugenics, where cultural differences were equated with 
biological deficiency. Here normalcy became a benchmark by which children, colonized peoples and 
disabled people were judged, meaning that conceptions of normal and pathological behavior and 
psychology were made possible through the colonial binary of the ‘normal’ West and the pathological 
‘Rest’ (Eriksson Baaz 2005). For Meekosha this means that: 
 
 The idea of racial and gender supremacy of the Northern Hemisphere is very much 
tied to the production of disability in the global South and racialised evolutionary 
hierarchies constructed the colonised as backward, infantile and animal-like. We 
cannot meaningfully separate the racialised subaltern from the disabled subaltern in 
the process of colonisation (2011, 672-673). 
 
Alongside seeing colonized people as child-like, the colonies themselves were seen as capable of 
disabling white children, and preventing them from ‘growing up’. It was assumed in Britain that if the 
colonizer’s children were not sent back to Europe from the colonies during the important years of 
childhood, they would become “stunted in growth and debilitated in mind” (Thomson 1843, 116). In 
tracing the above history, it becomes possible to see how “childhood and disability have provided 
interlinked markers of the helplessness, dependency and subnormality of the ‘Third World’ countries”, 
continuing today within the contemporary development regime, humanitarian rhetoric and 




Above we traced the co-constitutive histories of imperialism, developmentalism and normalcy, and 
the centrality of child-colony-mad-‘crip’ to this history. Throughout this we see examples of how 
“savages were made developmentally equivalent to children” (Castañeda 2002, 26), and implications 
of this in terms of paternalistic colonial dominance. Hence Nandy’s claim that “much of the pull of 
the ideology of colonialism and much of the power of the idea of modernity can be traced to the 
evolutionary implications of the concept of the child in the Western worldview” (1987/2007, 57). 
Developmental logic is key to white supremacist narratives of progress linked to the nation state, and 
used to justify colonialism as a civilizational and economic project (Klein and Mills 2017). Here the 
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history of the development of Western countries is imagined as a linear trajectory of progress that all 
countries must pass through in order to ‘develop’. Cultural recapitulation assumes that in their lifetime, 
an individual body will reproduce the same developmental stages as the development of the species 
body. This is central to the colonial idea that: 
  
the adults of inferior groups must be like the children of superior groups, for the child 
represents a primitive adult ancestor. If adult Blacks and women are like white male children, 
then they are living representations of an ancestral stage in the evolution of white males. An 
anatomical theory for ranking races-based on entire bodies-had been found (Gould 1981, cited 
in Mclintock 1995, 51).  
 
This is summarized by the social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, who said that “the intellectual traits of 
the uncivilized …are traits recurring in the children of the civilized” (1895, 89-90). Gould (1981) shows 
the influence of recapitulation in Freudian and Jungian theories, and within the school curriculum in 
the USA, where a number of school boards “prescribed the Song of Hiawatha in early grades, 
reasoning that [white] children, passing through the savage stage of their ancestral past, would identify 
with it” (114). The Song of Hiawatha, authored by a white man and telling the story of the noble 
savage and the vanishing Indian, was also taught in residential and industrial schools for Indigenous 
children throughout the USA and Canada as an attempt to socialize Indigenous peoples into inferior 
roles (White 2016). Recapitulation was a central argument in justifying colonial expansion into what 
was known as ‘tropical Africa’, where Kidd (1898) wrote that African peoples “represent the same 
stage in the history of the development of the race that the child does in the history of the development 
of the individual. The tropics will not, therefore, be developed by the native’s themselves (51).  
 
Recapitulation is evident also in Freudian constructions of “the aboriginal [as] Europe’s childhood 
and her children” (Emberley 2007, 97).  Castañeda takes this further, showing how “the now of the 
primitive was not only placed in the time of childhood, but also in the child-body: the child was seen 
as a bodily theater where human history could be observed to unfold in the compressed timespan of 
individual development” (2002, 13). This posits a shared global developmental telos of multiple forms 
of development, from the child to the economy, that positions the ‘West’ as more advanced, with 
global South countries constructed as needing to catch up and ‘grow up’.  
 
This links closely to the growth of developmental psychology and developmental stage theories that 
portray child development as a series of distinct naturalized stages, akin to evolution, through which 
a child passes on a linear pathway. These theories have come to be applied and used to understand 
diverse areas of life - from the growth of a child to the construction of nation states. Children who 
don’t meet prescribed progress are said to be developmentally delayed (Valdivia 1999), while whole 
populations of the global South have been and continue to be framed as under-developed or 
developing societies, and in need of ‘western’ expertise.   Interestingly, those deemed mad and/or 
‘crip’ are often framed as being wrongly-developed. 
 
 
Discussion: Infantilisation of the Global South and the Fourth World 
 
The centrality of parent-child metaphors to nineteenth-century colonialist imperialism is well 
documented in postcolonial scholarship (Ashcroft 1989), where the idea of the child functions to 
make thinkable the colonial apparatus of ‘improvement’ used to justify subjugation (Wallace 1994).  
Linked to the construction of children as the ‘property’ of their parents, “parental care and education 
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have often been a cover for the widespread social and psychological exploitation of children” (Nandy 
1987/2007, 60). Like colonial interventions into child-saving, child-focused development initiatives 
often justify the child as site of intervention through appeal to a developmental narrative of early 
intervention, constructing children as “objects for adult and institutional intervention” (Valentin and 
Meinert 2009, 23). The framing of whole populations as child-like, and thus as unable to take care of 
their own children, extends into current day neo-colonial practices of child-saving within multiple 
development projects in the global South. Valentin and Meinert (2009) trace how the idea of “civilizing 
through children” (29) continues in the global South through child-focused development projects that 
are heavily reliant on foreign aid. Through global inequalities in power, the global North acts in loco 
parentis of the global South, meaning the “‘adult North’ can bestow rights and duties on the ‘young 
South’, and if the South fails to comply with these, can implement sanctions” (Valentin and Meinert 
2009, 24).  Indeed, the legal doctrine of in loco parentis implies not only the parentification of one 
individual or group and the infantilisation of another, but that there is a responsibility on the part of the 
former to maintain that status over the latter and to make decisions in their best interest, including 
exerting discipline. This sense of responsibility, and the professed benevolence that ostensibly inform 
it, obscures the oppressive and coercive relations that it enforces. 
 
Here populations of the global South are not only being talked about as children, they are being acted 
upon as if they were children, with global North countries working in loco parentis for children of the 
global South, further serving to infantilise populations of the global South, especially those in receipt 
of aid (Burman 1994). This extends to the treatment of Indigenous peoples in current settler-colonies 
in the Fourth World, and of racialized peoples globally. The doctrine of in loco parentis is understood 
to allow for parental substitutions for children or ‘incapacitated’ adults when their ‘natural’ parents are 
unable to perform their parental duties.  However, in the colonial context this doctrine was used by 
some settler nation states to make decisions for the colonized groups they deemed childlike and in 
need of parental guidance, often resulting in economic exploitation and the furthering of the capitalist 
colonial agenda.  In the context of the treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada, Chrisjohn and 
McKay (2017) poignantly explain that:  
 
The Indian Act, for example, on the assumption that we were, essentially, children in 
grown-up bodies, placed the government in position of control over our economic 
resources.  Search the histories of what royalty deals Canada, in loco parentis, made in our 
name with oil companies, and ask if you want your parents to behave like this (p. 167, 
emphasis in original). 
 
Chrisjohn and McKay (2017) further note that still to this day Indigenous peoples in Canada 
experience “racism, marginalization, condescension, infantilisation, disparagement, and 
(unidirectional) cultural ignorance” (97). As we have seen, the ways in which the infantilisation of 
Indigenous peoples and the enacting of the doctrine of in loco parentis - which in its very construction 
forcibly fabricates dependent parent-child relations - is then characterized as mental illness in the form 
of dependency within those who have been infantilised.  
 
Both in loco parentis and the related legal doctrine of in parens patriae may be used to create a parental 
substitute for either a child or an ‘incapacitated’ adult, and as we have seen, in relation to colonized 
peoples as a group. Both historically and in current times, these doctrines have been used to allow the 
state, or a substitute adult or institution, to act, for example, as the “general guardian of all infants, 
lunatics, idiots” (Blackstone 1769) or, for example, in the “role of a parent to a child who is under 18 
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or 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability” (US 
Department of Labour 1993) in many Western countries.  In order to further ensure that adults who 
have been deemed mad or ‘crip’ and are seen as incompetent are unable to make decisions for 
themselves within health institutions, for example, many countries have also adopted specific 
legislation around medically assessing capacity, such as the Mental Capacity Act in Canada. We see 
how the infantilisation of colonized, mad and ‘crip’ subjects has over time become enshrined within 
Western legal doctrines and legislation, all the while reproducing the notion that children themselves 
are naturally incompetent.  This locates racialized/colonized children, psychiatrized children and 
intellectually disabled children in a particularly dehumanizing space within these white supremacist 
hierarchical arrangements. 
 
Likewise, in child protection cases, where parents are deemed unable to protect their children from 
neglect and/or abuse, in parens patriae may be invoked to give the state the right to parent, and engage 
in the associated responsibilities in relation to protecting actual children.  As we saw above, with the 
overrepresentation of Indigenous children living in Fourth World contexts within neo-colonial child 
protection systems, as well as the overrepresentation of black and racialized children within these same 
racist child protection systems (Clarke 2011; Pon, Gosine, and Phillips 2011), the invoking of the legal 
doctrine of in parens patriae is rampantly used against both Indigenous families and black settler families 
in Canada.   If colonial administrators served in loco parentis for the adults they were colonizing - as a 
surreptitious means to engage in economic exploitation at the same time as promoting degradation 
through infantilisation and scientific racism - and then the state served in parens patriae for many of the 
children of those infantilised adults, the implications become stark for generations of actual children 
whose parents have been deemed as in need of parenting themselves.  
 
Further to Burman’s (1994) analysis of infantilisation within global North-South relations, we also see 
then how the adult-Western world ‘benevolently’ offers help and knowledge to the infantilised-Fourth 
World, repeating the colonial paternalism inherent to Indigenous-colonizer relations in what is now 
Canada, formalized in the Gradual Civilization Act (1857) and the British North American Act (1867), 
amongst other early legislation, which was then consolidated within the Indian Act (1876).  This 
Western ‘benevolence’ was then further cemented more than a century later within children’s rights 
discourse through the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Pupavac (2001) writes that 
the export of western child developmental models “in the absence of the universalisation of the 
conditions upon which the model[s] arose” (103), serves to legitimize western governmental and non-
governmental actors acting in children’s ‘best interests’ and on their behalf in the global South, as well 
as, we argue, within Fourth World communities. This also echoes Nieuwenhuys’ (2009) assertion that 
development agencies (and, we add, child protection agencies) push the global South (and, we add, 
Indigenous communities located elsewhere) for “the emulation of a kind of childhood that the West 
has set as a global standard” (148). Here we see a dual epistemic injustice, whereby those deemed 
child-like and actual children are seen as seen as cognitively sub-par, while at the same time other/ed 
ways of knowing children are actively denigrated by western models – destroying epistemological 
diversity in relation to children. This results in current day advancing of the longstanding and now 
deep-rooted (white) Western agenda of assimilation and genocide within both former colonies and 
current white settler colonial nation states.  
 
And yet, the kind of childhood that the West has set as the golden standard is one where children are 
denigrated which is in striking opposition to the ways in which children are valued within many 
Indigenous cultures within the Fourth World. For example, the lack of a common understanding of 
what constitutes childhood led to misunderstandings amongst the some of the first missionaries in 
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Canada.  With the goal of engaging in the assimilation of the Wendot peoples, referred to as the 
Hurons, through Frenchification (Jaenen 1968), Gabriel Sagard, a Recollects missionary, documented 
his attempts.  In his writings from 1623-1624 when he lived amongst the Hurons, Sagard notes that 
the Huron’s did not hold a high opinion of French settlers but “in comparison with whom they 
considered their children wiser and more intelligent, so good a conceit have they of themselves and 
so little esteem for others” (Wrong 1939, 138).  Betrayed in this description is Sagard’s projecting of 
the European’s lack of esteem for children onto the words of the Hurons.  As Oneida academic and 
critical psychologist Roland Chrisjohn explains, the concept of ‘children’ within the Iroquois 
Federation (of which the Huron’s form part) is not the insult that it is from the Euro-Western 
perspective. “Rather, our word (for children) merely implies someone who hasn't been around as long 
as some other people: ‘Someone who is inexperienced with regard to certain things’ is what was being 
implied, not ‘someone not to be taken seriously because they have underdeveloped mental skills…’”.7 
As such, the Huron’s may have been communicating to Sagard that the French settlers’ had less 
experience living in the bush than the Huron children, which no one would have likely taken issue 
with at the time.  However, so ingrained within the Euro-Western mindset that children are in many 
ways sub-human, the mention of a comparison between the French settlers and children directly 
connects to the degrading discourse of the time that infantilised all Indigenous people as being 
childlike and in need of guidance from the colonizers. It appears that the Huron’s words were 
misunderstood and mischaracterized by Sagard’s Euro-Western lens.  This, however, is not to imply 
that all non-Western cultural understandings are somehow innocent or not degrading of children, or 
disabled people (Kolářová 2016). 
 
 
Throughout this article we have demonstrated the ways in which child as metaphor functions to 
denigrate colonized, psychiatrized and/or intellectually disabled people, as it reproduces these groups 
and actual children as being irrational, incompetent, unintelligent, animistic, in need of (parental) 
guidance, (economically) unproductive, and epistemically void.  The use of this metaphor, as we have 
seen, performs important political agendas inherent to the colonial project, racism, epistemicide, the 
medicalization of madness and disability, and the subjugating notions of development that unpins 
each.  All this is accomplished by focusing on and imposing a pejorative Western understanding of 
childhood that may be neither consistent with Indigenous/non-Western understandings of what 
constitutes childhood nor consistent with actual children’s abilities.  Regardless, the material and 
discursive impact on children has been demonstrated to include multi-systemic oppression including 
the interplay of adultism, colonialism, racism, sanism and dis/ableism, which mutually constitute and 
complicate each other. This interplay takes place at the level of adult-child relations and the psy 
governance of childhood itself, within global North-South-Fourth World relations and the racist 
infantilisation-parentification constructed within them, as well as within sane-mad relations and 
ableist-‘crip' relations, including the psy and medical domination that governs both.   
 
A transdisciplinary approach has enabled the deconstruction of the co-constitutive metaphors of mad, 
‘crip’, child, and colony/savage. This has made visible how the psy-disciplines have been constituted 
through colonialism and so are always already a colonial practice, and how the psy-disciplines and 
colonialism (even when seemingly operating apart from one another) use similar tools which are built 
upon the interlacing metaphors of madness, disability, savagery, and childhood. We suggest that a 
transdisciplinary (critical) childhood studies must continue to unsettle and reconcile its current and 
                                                 
7 Personal communication, August 14, 2017. 
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historical attachment both to development (in its various disciplinary and applied forms) and to 
whiteness by embracing and maturing into a symbiotic interdependence with critical race, 
transnational and postcolonial theories (Sehume, 2013).  So too do we suggest the need for a greater 
influence and integration of deconstructed notions of adultism, and the unsettling of adultist forms of 
knowledge production, within and beyond the academy, including within critical race informed 
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